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ABSTRACT
The damage personal attacks cause to online discourse motivates
many platforms to try to curb the phenomenon. However, under-
standing the prevalence and impact of personal attacks in online
platforms at scale remains surprisingly difficult. The contribution
of this paper is to develop and illustrate a method that combines
crowdsourcing and machine learning to analyze personal attacks
at scale. We show an evaluation method for a classifier in terms
of the aggregated number of crowd-workers it can approximate.
We apply our methodology to English Wikipedia, generating a cor-
pus of over 100k high quality human-labeled comments and 63M
machine-labeled ones from a classifier that is as good as the aggre-
gate of 3 crowd-workers, as measured by the area under the ROC
curve and Spearman correlation. Using this corpus of machine-
labeled scores, our methodology allows us to explore some of the
open questions about the nature of online personal attacks. This
reveals that the majority of personal attacks on Wikipedia are not
the result of a few malicious users, nor primarily the consequence
of allowing anonymous contributions from unregistered users.
1. INTRODUCTION
With the rise of social media platforms, online discussion has
become integral to people’s experience of the internet. Unfortu-
nately, online discussion is also an avenue for abuse. A 2014 Pew
Report highlights that 73% of adult internet users have seen some-
one harassed online, and 40% have personally experienced it [5].
Platforms combat this with policies concerning such behavior. For
example Wikipedia has a policy of “Do not make personal attacks
anywhere in Wikipedia”[33] and notes that attacks may be removed
and the users who wrote them blocked.1
The challenge of creating effective policies to identify and ap-
propriately respond to harassment is compounded by the difficulty
of studying the phenomena at scale. Typical annotation efforts of
abusive language, such as that of Warner and Hirschberg [27], in-
volve labeling thousands of comments, however platforms often
*Equal contribution.
1This study uses data from English Wikipedia, which for brevity
we will simply refer to as Wikipedia.
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have many orders of magnitude more; Wikipedia for instance has
63M English talk page comments. Even using crowd-workers, get-
ting human-annotations for a large corpus is prohibitively expen-
sive and time consuming.
The primary contribution of this paper is a methodology for quan-
titative, large-scale, longitudinal analysis of a large corpus of on-
line comments. Our analysis is applicable to properties of com-
ments that can be labeled by crowd-workers with high levels of
inter-annotator agreement. We apply our methodology to personal
attacks on Wikipedia, inspired by calls from the community for re-
search to understand and reduce the level of toxic discussions [31,
30], and by the clear policy Wikipedia has on personal attacks [33].
We start by crowdsourcing a small fraction of the corpus, label-
ing each comment according to whether it is a personal attack or
not. We use this data to train a simple machine learning classifier
and experiment with features and labeling methods. The machine
learning methods are not novel, but their application does validate
and extend the findings of Nobata et al. [15]: character-level n-
grams result in an impressively flexible and performant classifier
for a variety of abusive language in English. We additionally note
that using the empirical distribution of human-ratings, rather than
the majority vote, produces a better classifier, even in terms of the
AUC metric.
The classifier is then used to annotate the entire corpus of com-
ments - acting as a surrogate for crowd-workers. To know how
meaningful the automated annotations are, we develop an evalua-
tion method for comparing an algorithm to a group of human an-
notators. We show that our classifier is as good at generating labels
as aggregating the judgments of 3 crowd-workers. To enable inde-
pendent replication of the work in this paper, as well as to support
further quantitative research, we have made public our corpus of
both human and machine annotations as well as the classifier we
trained [36].
We use our classifier’s annotations to perform quantitative anal-
ysis over the whole corpus of comments. To ensure that our results
accurately reflect the real prevalence of personal attacks within dif-
ferent sub-groups of comments, we select a threshold that appro-
priately balances precision and recall. We also empirically validate
that the threshold produces results on subgroups of comments com-
mensurate with the results of crowd-workers.
This allows us to answer questions that our much smaller sample
of crowdsourced annotations alone would struggle to. We illustrate
this by showing how to use our method to explore several open
questions about the nature of personal attacks on Wikipedia: What
is the impact of allowing anonymous contributions, namely those
from unregistered users? How do attacks vary with the quantity
of a user’s contributions? Are attacks concentrated among a few
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users? When do attacks result in a moderator action? And is there
a pattern to the timing of personal attacks?
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows: Sec. 2 discusses re-
lated work on the prevalence, impact, and detection of personal
attacks and closely related online behaviors. In Sec. 3 we describe
our data collection and labeling methodology. Sec. 4 covers our
model-building and evaluation approaches. We describe our anal-
ysis of personal attacks in Wikipedia in Sec. 5. We conclude in
Sec. 6 and outline challenges with our method and possible avenues
of future work.
2. RELATED WORK
Definitions, Prevalence and Impact. One of the challenges in
studying negative online behavior is the myriad of forms it can take
and the lack of a clear, common definition [19]. While this study
focuses on personal attacks, other studies explore different forms of
online behavior including hate speech ([7], [13], [19], [27]), online
harassment ([3], [40]), and cyberbullying ([17], [20], [25], [35],
[38]).
Online harassment itself is sometimes further divided into a tax-
onomy of forms. A recent Pew Research Center study defines on-
line harassment to include being: called offensive names, purpose-
fully embarrassed, stalked, sexually harassed, physically threat-
ened, and harassed in a sustained manner [5]. The Wikimedia
Foundation Support and Safety team conducted a similar survey
[23] using a different taxonomy (see Figure 1).
Figure 1: Forms of harassment experienced on Wikimedia [23].
This toxic behavior has a demonstrated impact on community
health both on and off-line. The Wikimedia Foundation found that
54% of those who had experienced online harassment expressed
decreased participation in the project where they experienced the
harassment [23]. Online hate speech and cyberbullying are also
closely connected to suppressing the expression of others [21], phys-
ical violence [29], and suicide [4].
Automated Detection. There have been a number of recent papers
on detecting forms of toxic behavior in online discussions. Much of
this work builds on existing machine learning approaches in fields
like sentiment analysis [16] and spam detection [22]. On the topic
of harassment, the earliest work on machine learning based detec-
tion is Yin et al.’s 2009 paper [40] which used support vector ma-
chines on sentiment and context features extracted from the CAW
2.0 dataset [6]. In [21], Sood et al. use the same algorithmic frame-
work to detect personal insults using a dataset labeled via Amazon
Mechanical Turk from the Yahoo! Buzz social news site. Dinakar
et al. [4] decompose the issue of cyberbullying by training separate
classifiers for attacks based on sexual orientation, race or intelli-
gence in YouTube comments. Building on these works, Cheng et
al. [3] use random forests and logistic regression techniques to
predict which users of the comment sections of several news sites
would become banned for antisocial behavior. Most recently, No-
bata et al. [15] extract character n-gram, linguistic, syntactic, and
distributional semantic features from a very large corpus of Yahoo!
Finance and News comments to detect abusive language.
Data Sets. A barrier to further algorithmic progress in the detec-
tion of toxic behavior is a dearth of large publicly available datasets
[19]. To our knowledge, the current open datasets are limited to the
Internet Argument Corpus [26], the CAW 2.0 dataset provided by
the Fundacion Barcelona Media [6], the "Hate Speech Twitter An-
notations" corpus[28], and the "Detecting Insults in Social Com-
mentary" dataset released by Impermium via Kaggle [10]. In past
work, many researchers have relied on creating their own hand-
coded datasets ([13], [21], [27]), using crowd-sourced or in-house
annotators. These approaches limit the size of the labeled corpora
due to the expense of labeling examples. A few authors have sug-
gested alternative techniques that could be effective in obtaining
larger scale datasets. In [19], Saleem et al. outline some of the lim-
itations of using a small hand-coded dataset and suggest an alter-
native approach that uses all comments within specific online com-
munities as positive and negative training examples of hate speech.
Xiang et al. [37] use topic modeling approaches along with a small
seed set of tweets to produce a training set for detecting offensive
tweets containing over 650 million entries. Building on the work
of [40], Moore et al. [14] use a simple rule-based algorithm for
automatic labeling of forum posts on which they wish to do further
analysis.
3. CROWDSOURCING
In this section we discuss our approach to identifying personal
attacks in a subset of Wikipedia discussion comments via crowd-
sourcing. The crowdsourcing process involves:
1. generating a corpus of Wikipedia discussion comments,
2. choosing a question for eliciting human judgments,
3. selecting a subset of the discussion corpus to label,
4. designing a strategy for eliciting reliable labels.
To generate a corpus of discussion comments, we processed the
public dump of the full history of English Wikipedia as described in
Appendix A. The corpus contains 63M comments from discussions
relating to user pages and articles dating from 2004-2015.
The question we posed to get human judgments on whether a
comment contains a personal attack is shown in Figure 2. In addi-
tion to identifying the presence of an attack, we also try to elicit if
the attack has a target or whether the comment quotes a previous
attack. We do not, however, make use of this additional information
in this study. Before settling on the exact phrasing of the question,
we experimented with several variants and chose the one with the
highest inter-annotator agreement on a set of 1000 comments.
Figure 2: The question posed to our Crowdflower annotators.
To ensure representativeness, we undertook the standard approach
of randomly sampling comments from the full corpus. We will re-
fer to this set of comments as the random dataset. Through labeling
a random sample, we discovered that the overall prevalence of per-
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sonal attacks on Wikipedia talk pages is around 1% (see Section
5.1).
To allow training of classifiers, we need to create a corpus that
contains a sufficient number and variety of examples of personal
attacks. In order to obtain these, we enhance our random dataset
by also sampling comments made by users who where blocked for
violating Wikipedia’s policy on personal attacks [33]. In particu-
lar, we consider the 5 comments made by these users around every
block event. We call this the blocked dataset and note that it has a
much higher prevalence of attacks (approximately 17%).
Sample Type Annotated
Comments
Percentage
Attacking
Random 37611 0.9 %
Blocked 78126 16.9 %
Total 115737 11.7 %
Table 1: Summary statistics of labeled data. Each comment was
labeled 10 times. Here we define a comment as an attack if the
majority of annotators labeled it as such.
We labeled our subset of comments using the Crowdflower crowd-
sourcing platform.2 Crowdsourcing as a data collection method-
ology is well studied ([2], [24]) and has proven effective for con-
structing corpora for machine learning in various contexts ([3], [13],
[18], [21], [27]).
As a first step to ensuring data quality, each annotator was re-
quired to pass a test of 10 questions. These questions were ran-
domly selected from a set that we devised to contain balanced rep-
resentation of both attacking and non-attacking comments. An-
notators whose accuracy on these test questions fell below a 70%
threshold would be removed from the task. This improved our an-
notator quality by excluding the worst ~2% of contributors. Under
the Crowdflower system, additional test questions are randomly in-
terspersed with the genuine crowdsourcing task (at a rate of 10%)
in order to maintain response quality throughout the task.
In order to get reliable estimates of whether a comment is a per-
sonal attack, each comment was labeled by at least 10 different
Crowdflower annotators. This allows us to aggregate judgments
from 10 separate people when constructing a single label for each
comment. We chose 10 judgments based on experiments in Sec. 4.3
that showed that aggregating more judgments provided little further
improvement. Finally, we applied several data cleaning steps to
the Crowdflower annotations. This included removing annotations
where the same worker labeled a comment as both an attack and
not an attack and removing comments that most workers flagged as
not being English.
We evaluated the quality of our crowd-sourcing pipeline by mea-
suring inter-annotator agreement [11]. This technique measures
whether a set of “common instructions to different observers of the
same set of phenomena, yields the same data within a tolerable mar-
gin of error” [9]. We chose the specific inter-annotator agreement
metric of Krippendorf’s alpha due to our context, where multiple
raters rate overlapping, but disparate sets of comments [12]. Our
data achieves a Krippendorf’s alpha score of 0.45. This result is
in-line with results achieved in other crowdsourced studies of toxic
behavior in online communities [3].
4. MODEL BUILDING
2https://www.crowdflower.com/
We now use the set of crowdsourced annotations to build a ma-
chine learning classifier for identifying personal attacks. We first
discuss the set of machine learning architectures we explored and
then describe our evaluation methodology.
4.1 Model Building Methodology
We treat the problem of identifying personal attacks as a binary
text classification problem. We rely purely on features extracted
from the comment text instead of including features based on the
authors’ past behavior and the discussion context. This makes it
easy for Wikipedia editors and administrators, journalists and other
researchers to explore the strengths and weaknesses of the models
by simply generating text examples. It also allows the models to be
applied beyond the context of Wikipedia.
In terms of model architectures, we explored logistic regression
(LR), and multi-layer perceptrons (MLP). In future work, we plan
to experiment with long short-term memory recurrent neural net-
works (LSTM) as well. For the LR and MLP models we simply use
bag-of-words representations based on either word- or character-
level n-grams. Past work in the domain of detecting abusive lan-
guage in online discussion comments, showed that simple n-gram
features are more powerful than linguistic and syntactic features,
hand-engineered lexicons, and word and paragraph embeddings
[15].
In all of the model architectures, we have a final softmax layer
and use the cross-entropy as our loss function. The cross-entropy
function is defined as:
H(y, yˆ) =−
∑
i
yi log(yˆi) (1)
where yˆ is our predicted probability distribution over classes, and y
is the true distribution.
In addition to experimenting with different model architectures,
we also experimented with two different ways of synthesizing our
10 human annotations per comment to create training labels. In
the traditional classification approach, there is only one true class
and so the true distribution, y, is represented as a one-hot (OH)
vector determined by the majority class in the comment’s set of
annotations.
For the problem of identifying personal attacks, however, one
can argue that there is no single true class. Different people may
judge the same comment differently. Unsurprisingly, we see this in
the annotation data: most comments do not have a unanimous set
of judgments, and the fraction of annotators who think a comment
is an attack differs across comments.
The set of annotations per comment naturally forms an approxi-
mate empirical distribution (ED) over opinions of whether the com-
ment is an attack. A comment considered a personal attack by 7 of
10 annotators can thus be given a true label of [0.3, 0.7] instead of
[0,1]. Using ED labels is motivated by the intuition that comments
for which 100% of annotators think it is an attack are probably
different in nature from comments where only 60% of annotators
consider it so. Since the majority class is the same in both cases,
the OH labels lose the distinction. Hence, in addition to the OH
labels, we also trained each architecture using ED labels.
Finally, we should note that the interpretation of a model’s scores
depends on whether it was trained on ED or OH labels. In the
case of a model trained on ED labels, the attack score represents
the predicted fraction of annotators who would consider the com-
ment an attack. In the case of a model trained on OH labels, the
attack score represents the probability that the majority of annota-
tors would consider the comment an attack.
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4.2 Model Building Evaluation
As discussed above, we considered three major dimensions in
the model design space:
1. model architecture (LR, MLP)
2. n-gram type (word, char)
3. label type (OH, ED)
In order to evaluate each of the 8 possible modeling strategies we
randomly split our set of annotations into train, development and
test splits (in a 3:1:1 ratio). For each model, we performed 15 itera-
tions of random search over a grid of relevant hyper-parameters[1].3
During the model tuning process, each run was trained on the train
split and evaluated on the development split. Table 2 shows two
evaluation metrics for each of the 8 tuned models. The standard 2-
class area under the receiver operating characteristic curve (AUC)
score is computed between the models’ predicted probability of be-
ing an attack and the majority class label in the set of annotations
for each comment. To better evaluate the performance of models
trained on ED labels, we also include the Spearman rank correlation
between the models’ predicted probability of being an attack and
the fraction of annotators who considered the comment an attack.
Model
Type
N-Gram
Type
Label
Type
AUC Spearman
LR Word OH 94.62 53.16
ED 95.55 65.2
Char OH 96.18 59.20
ED 96.24 66.68
MLP Word OH 95.25 56.11
ED 96.15 66.33
Char OH 95.90 58.77
ED 96.59 68.17
Table 2: Evaluation metrics of different model architectures trained
on the train split and evaluated on the development split. The
hyper-parameters of each architecture were tuned using random-
ized search
Across all model and label types, we see that character n-grams
outperform word n-grams, which is consistent with feature impor-
tance analysis in [15].4 We suspect this is due to the higher robust-
ness to spelling variations that char-n-grams exhibit, which are very
common in online discussions, especially in expletives commonly
used in personal attacks.
Another consistent pattern is the boost in the performance met-
rics for models trained using ED labels. The large boost in Spear-
man correlation is somewhat unsurprising because it is a function
of the fraction of annotators who consider a comment to be a per-
sonal attack. The models trained using OH labels did not receive
any supervision on how to estimate this fraction (they only see ma-
jority class). The interesting result is that even the AUC scores are
consistently higher: this means that using training labels that en-
code what fraction of people think a comment is an attack helps in
3For details on the set of hyper-parameters explored, we re-
fer the reader to the relevant notebook in our code repos-
itory: https://github.com/ewulczyn/wiki-detox/blob/
master/src/modeling/cv_ngram_architectures.ipynb
4Note we explored word n-grams in the range of 1-2 and characters
n-grams in the range 1-5. During the hyper-parameters search, we
searched over the same range of values for the number of n-gram
features to include.
predicting what the majority of annotators think. Our results indi-
cate that using ED labels may give a performance boost over the
standard OH labels for other machine-learning tasks using multiple
crowdsourced labels per training example.
4.3 Human Baseline Comparison
We developed a classifier for detecting personal attacks in order
to score the full history of comments on Wikipedia in a cost and
time effective manner. For our purposes, the model is an approx-
imation of the crowdsourcing process. Hence, we want to be able
to answer the question: How good of a surrogate is our model for
crowdsourced annotations?
To answer this we will use one group of annotators, call them the
prediction-group, to predict what another group of annotators, call
them the truth-group, thinks about a comment. We treat the aggre-
gated judgments of the truth-group as ground truth labels. We treat
the prediction-group as a model: an ensemble of annotators, who
pool their judgments to make predictions. Hence, we will refer to
the prediction-group as the annotator ensemble. By comparing our
machine learning model’s predictive power to the predictive power
of the annotator ensemble, we can get an estimate of how good of a
surrogate our model is for a fixed size annotator ensemble. We will
refer to this method of generating baselines as annotator ensemble
baselining.
To be more specific, let’s fix the size of the truth-group at nt and
the size of the prediction-group at np. Assume we have collected
at least nt + np annotations per comment in our corpus. Now, for
each comment c, we randomly split the full set of annotations for c
into two non-overlapping sets, Tc for the truth-group and Pc for the
prediction-group, of sizes nt and np respectively. We split the set of
annotators at the comment level, since the corpus of comments may
be so large that not every annotator judges every comment, making
a fixed split across all comments impossible in general. We will ag-
gregate annotations in Tc using the function aggtrue to get a ground
truth label y(c) for comment c. The choice of aggtrue depends on
the evaluation metric we want to use. For the AUC metric aggtrue
is the OH aggregation function, whereas for Spearman correlation
aggtrue is the ED aggregation function. We will take the average
of the annotations in Pc to get a prediction yˆ(c)AE . We apply our
machine learning model, to comment c to get prediction yˆ(c)ML.
Finally, we compute the evaluation metrics of AUC and Spearman
correlation over the entire corpus between y and yˆML and between
y and yˆAE to compare the machine learning model to the annota-
tor ensemble. The comparison of these scores, tells us how good
our model is compared to an ensemble of annotators of size np at
predicting labels generated by pooling nt annotations.
Note that, for each question, the annotators are randomly split
into a prediction-group and a truth-group. As a result, there is some
variability in the evaluation metrics stemming from this assignment
step. By running the entire process several times, we can estimate
this variability and average the evaluation metric results from each
run to get a more stable estimate.
We applied our annotator ensemble baselining method to a set
of 8,000 comments from the test split and had each comment la-
beled 20 times. We will refer to this special subset of comments as
the baseline split. Out of the baseline split, 4000 comments come
from our random dataset and 4000 come from our blocked dataset.
We fix nt , the number of annotations used to generate labels, at
10, since this is the number of annotations per comment used in
training the model. Table 3 shows AUC scores and Spearman cor-
relations for the aggregate prediction of the prediction-group as we
vary its size np from 1 to 10. The final line of the table also reports
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the values for the best LR model architecture from Table 2.5 The
reported mean scores and standard errors are the result of running
the entire process 25 times.
For the annotator ensemble, both the AUC scores and Spearman
correlations increase with diminishing returns as the size of the en-
semble increases. On both of our metrics, our model outperforms
an annotator ensemble of size np = 3. Thus, by these two metrics,
running our model over the full history of comments in Wikipedia
is as good as having each comment labeled by 3 annotators.
np AUC Spearman
1 88.54 (0.42) 53.58 (0.79)
3 95.49 (0.31) 64.75 (0.44)
5 97.13 (0.23) 68.27 (0.46)
7 97.81 (0.15) 69.86 (0.60)
9 98.24 (0.14) 70.97 (0.44)
10 98.53 (0.12) 71.11 (0.36)
Model: 97.19 (0.14) 66.02 (0.44)
Table 3: Mean evaluation metrics (and standard errors) on the
baseline split, fixing the truth-group size nt at 10 and varying the
prediction-group size np.
5. ANALYSIS
Using the best personal attack classifier from Sec. 4.2, we obtain
a full corpus of machine-labeled discussions in Wikipedia. In this
section, we use the fully annotated corpus to better understand the
prevalence and nature of attacks in Wikipedia. For the following
analyses, we focus on comments made in 2015 and exclude admin-
istrative comments and comments generated by bots as described
in Appendix A.
5.1 Choosing a Threshold
Given a comment, our classifier outputs a continuous score in
the interval [0,1]. To get a discrete label from this score, we pick a
threshold t and let comments with a score above t have label 1, indi-
cating an attack. Using discrete labels makes it possible to identify
individual comments that are predicted to contain personal attacks
and estimate the fraction of attacks within a set of comments.
To choose a threshold, we pick the point that strikes a balance be-
tween precision and recall on random evaluation data. A key prop-
erty of this threshold for the purpose of using machine-generated
labels for analysis, is that false positives are offset by false nega-
tives. As a result, the fraction of comments that are labeled as at-
tacks by the classifier is the same as the fraction of comments that
are labeled as attacks by the human annotators. Hence, we refer to
this threshold as the equal-error threshold.6
To see how well this property generalizes to new data, we used
the equal-error threshold on the development set and used it to get
model-generated labels for the test set. Fig. 3a shows that the es-
timated rate of attacks computed using model-generated labels lies
within a 95% confidence interval for the rate of attacks computed
from crowd-generated labels.
5Note that the reported performance of our model is slightly differ-
ent in Table 2 than in Table 3, since in the former table the model is
evaluated on the dev split, while in the latter table it is evaluated in
the baseline split and ratios of random to blocked comments differ
across the two splits.
6This threshold also maximizes the F1 score, since our precision
and recall are monotonic functions of the decision threshold.
Even though the thresholded model-scores give good estimates
of the rate of attacks over a random sample of comments, it is not
given that they also give accurate estimates when partitioning com-
ments into different groups. To provide empirical evidence that
the thresholded scores give accurate estimates when subdividing
the dataset into groups that will be important for later analysis, we
shows various splits of the dataset in Fig. 5.1. We split on the year
the comment was posted, by whether the author was logged-in, by
the number of days the author has been active and by whether the
comment contains the n-gram "thank", an important feature of the
classifier. For the following analyses, we then use the equal-error
threshold over the union of the development and tests sets. At this
threshold (t = 0.425), the precision is 0.63, the recall (e.g true-
positive rate) is 0.63 and the false-positive rate is 0.0034.
(a) (b) (c)
(d) (e) (f)
Figure 3: Bootstrapped confidence intervals for the fraction of at-
tacks within the test set broken down by (b) discussion namespace,
(c) year, (d) logged in status of the author, (e) number of days au-
thor made an edit as of 2015, (f) whether the comment contains
the word "thank". Blue intervals come from ground-truth human
labels, green intervals come from machine generated labels.
5.2 Understanding Attacks
In this section, we ask a number of questions about the nature of
attackers, attack timing, and moderation on Wikipedia. We investi-
gate the answers using our machine-labeled data at the equal-error
threshold.
What is the impact of anonymity?
Wikipedia users can make edits either under a registered user-
name or anonymously. In the latter case, the edits are attributed to
the IP address from which they were made.7 Table 4 shows that,
last year, 43% of editing accounts were anonymous and these con-
tributed 9.6% of the comments in our dataset.
It has been shown that anonymity provides psycho-social bene-
fits to cyberbullies [14] and can lead to "heightened aggression and
inappropriate behavior" [39]. We compare the prevalence of at-
tacks for registered and anonymous users in Table 4.8 This shows
that the attack prevalence among comments by anonymous users is
7This means that, in principle, there can be multiple users editing
under the same IP, and the same user editing under multiple IPs.
8A future analysis might also try to differentiate registered accounts
with a long running reputation from so called sock-puppet accounts
created by a user to appear as if their contributions are coming from
multiple users.
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six times as high as that of registered users. Thus, while anony-
mous contributions are much more likely to be an attack, overall
they contribute less than half of attacks. This difference of means
is significant at a p < 0.0001 (t=63.8) level. These extreme values
of significance are not surprising as our algorithm allows us to label
data at a population level.
Anonymity Number of
Accounts
Number of
Comments
Attack
Prevalence
Anonymous 97,742 191,460 3.1%
Registered 129,394 2,023,559 0.5%
Totals 227,136 2,215,019 0.8%
Table 4: Comment statistics by user anonymity (2015).
How do attacks vary with the quantity of a user’s contributions?
Editors on Wikipedia fall along a wide spectrum in terms of their
engagement with discussions on the platform. Some comment a
few times a year whereas others will comment several times a week.
For our purposes, a user’s activity level is the number of comments
that they made in 2015. In Fig. 4a, we show how many comments
were made by users with different activity levels. We see that over
60% of comments are made by users who made over 100 comments
over the year. Users who made 5 or fewer comments are only re-
sponsible for 15% of total comments.
(a) (b)
Figure 4: (a). A histogram of the percentage of total comments
by user activity level. (b) A histogram of the percentage of total
attacks by user activity level.
The story completely changes when we use these same user seg-
ments to understand attacking behavior. Fig. 4b shows the per-
centage of total attacks attributable to users with different activity
levels. We find that almost half of all attacks are made by users
with an activity level below 5. Even controlling for the effect of
anonymity that we saw earlier, more than 18% of attacking com-
ments are made by registered users with an activity level below 5.
Users with an activity level of over 100 comments (almost all of
whom are registered) are responsible for 30% of attacking com-
ments. Thus, users at both low and high levels of contribution are
responsible for a significant portion of attacks.
Are attacks concentrated among a few highly toxic users?
We define the toxicity level of a user to be the number of attacks
written by that user in 2015. By segmenting users by toxicity level,
we are able to uncover whether attacks are diffused among many
low toxicity users or concentrated among a few users with high
toxicity.
Fig. 5a describes the proportion of attacks made by users at dif-
ferent levels of toxicity. Fig. 5b provides the total number of users
at each toxicity level. By comparing these figures, we see that al-
most 80% of attacks come from the over 9000 users who have made
fewer than 5 attacking comments. However, the 34 users with a tox-
icity level of more than 20 are responsible for almost 9% of attacks.
Thus, while the majority of Wikipedia’s attacks are diffused infre-
quent attackers, significant progress could be made by moderating
a relatively small number of frequent attackers.
(a) (b)
Figure 5: (a) A histogram of the percentage of total attacks by user
toxicity level. (b) A histogram of the total number of users at each
toxicity level.
When do attacks result in moderation?
Moderators and administrators can enforce the policy on per-
sonal attacks [33] by warning or blocking offending users for a
period of time. Our analysis takes all attacking comments in the
2015 Wikipedia corpus and asks how many of these lead to a mod-
eration event in the following 7 days. We find that 7.7% of attacks
are followed by a warning and 7.0% of attacks are followed by a
block within this period. 11.3% of attacks are followed by either a
warning or a block.
As discussed in Sec. 5.1, at the equal-error threshold, our algo-
rithm has a precision of 0.63. After normalizing by this precision,
we find that 12.2% of the expected number of true attacks are fol-
lowed by a warning, 11.1% are followed by a block and 17.9 % are
followed by either. Thus, a high proportion of attacking comments
remain unmoderated.
There are a number of factors that affect the chances of moder-
ation, including repeated attacks and having been moderated in the
past. Fig. 6 shows us that the chance of being blocked or warned
increases with the number of personal attacks a user makes.
Figure 6: Probability of being warned or blocked in 2015 as a func-
tion of the number of personal attacks made in 2015
Finally, we see in Fig. 7 that the likelihood of a new attack lead-
ing to a block increases with the number of times a user has been
blocked in the past. This may be due to heightened scrutiny of pre-
viously blocked users. Alternatively, it may be that blocked users
make more frequent or more toxic attacks, and are hence more
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likely to be warned and moderated in the future.
Figure 7: Probability of being blocked again after a new attack as
function of the number of times the user has been blocked in the
past.
Is there a pattern to the timing of attacks?
With machine labeled longitudinal data, we can generate a time-
series of attacks in conversations as they occur on each page of
Wikipedia. This allows us to ask whether there is a pattern to the
timing of attacks in Wikipedia comments. To answer this ques-
tion, we segment every comment in our corpus by whether or not
it is a personal attack. We then build a neighborhood around each
comment consisting of the n comments that occurred on the same
page immediately before and after it, excluding the central com-
ment. For each central comment, we compute the fraction of at-
tacks that occur in this neighborhood and call this the neighboring
attack fraction of the central comment.
Table 5 shows the average neighboring attack fraction around
attacking and non-attacking comments at different values of n. We
see that even for small n, there is a significant difference (t = 56.2,
p < 0.0001) in neighboring attack fractions. Indeed, the neigh-
boring attack fraction for n = 1 is twenty-two times higher around
attacking comments than non-attacking comments. This is a strong
indication personal attacks cluster in time on Wikipedia discus-
sions.9 It also suggests that early intervention by moderators could
be an effective means of curbing the prevalence of personal attacks.
n Attacking Non-Attacking
1 15.6 % 0.7%
3 10.6 % 0.7 %
5 8.3 % 0.8 %
Table 5: Average neighboring attack fraction around attacking
comments and non-attacking comments.
6. DISCUSSION & CONCLUSION
We have introduced a methodology for generating large-scale,
longitudinal data on personal attacks in online discussions. Af-
ter crowdsourcing the identification of personal attacks within a
9A follow up analysis could investigate to what extent an initial
attack sparks retaliation.
sample of discussion comments, machine learning classification is
leveraged to scale the identification process to the whole corpus.
In so doing, we explored methods for aggregating multiple human
judgments per comment into training labels, compared different
model architectures and text features, and introduced a technique
for comparing the performance of machine learning models to hu-
man annotators.
We illustrated our methodology by applying it to Wikipedia, gen-
erating an open dataset of over 100k high-quality human-labeled
comments, 63M machine-labeled comments, and a classifier that
approximates the aggregate of 3 crowd-workers. We believe this
provides the largest corpus of human-labeled comments support-
ing the study of online toxicity to date.
By calibrating our classifier’s threshold we can then perform
large scale longitudinal analysis of the whole corpus of Wikipe-
dia discussions along a wide variety of dimensions. We illustrate
this by exploring some open questions about the nature of personal
attacks on Wikipedia. This leads to several interesting findings:
while anonymously contributed comments are 6 times more likely
to be an attack, they contribute less than half of the attacks. Simi-
larly less than half of attacks come from users with little prior par-
ticipation; and perhaps surprisingly, approximately 30% of attacks
come from registered users with over 100 contributions.
These results suggest the problems associated with personal at-
tacks do not have an easy solution. However, our study also shows
that less than a fifth of personal attacks currently trigger any action
for violating Wikipedia’s policy. Moreover, personal attacks clus-
ter in time - perhaps because one personal attacks triggers another.
If so, early intervention by a moderator could have a disproportion-
ately beneficial impact. Moreover, automated classifiers may then
be a valuable tool, not only for researchers, but also for moderators
on Wikipedia. They might be used to help moderators build dash-
boards that better visualize the health of Wikipedia conversations,
or to develop systems to better triage comments for review.
Perhaps the biggest challenge with our methodology is illus-
trated by our case study with Wikipedia: we used a relatively small
set of annotators, 4053 in total, whom we know little about. While
they have reasonable levels of inter-annotator agreement, their in-
terpretation of a comment being a personal attack may differ from
that of the Wikipedia community. Moreover, the crowdsourced data
may also result in other forms of unintended bias.
This brings up key questions for our method and more generally
for applications of machine learning to analysis of comments: who
defines the truth for the property in question? How much do clas-
sifiers vary depending on who is asked? What is the subsequent
impact of applying a model with unintended bias to help an online
community’s discussion?
The methodology and data sets we have developed also open
many other avenues for further work. The corpus of human-labeled
comments can be used train more sophisticated machine learning
models. It can also be used to analyze Wikipedia with traditional
statistical inference, while our corpus of machine-labels can be em-
ployed to carry out further analysis that require large scale and lon-
gitudinal data. While there are many such questions to analyze,
some notable examples include:
1. What is the impact of personal attacks on a user’s future con-
tributions?
2. What interventions can reduce the level of personal attacks
on a conversation?
3. What are the triggers for personal attacks in Wikipedia com-
ments?
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Finally, we remark that our methodology can easily be applied to
different characteristics of comments, not just personal attacks. As
mentioned in Sec. 2, there are many taxonomies by which one can
analyze the positive and negative properties of a comment. There
are also many other discussion corpora to be considered.
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APPENDIX
A. WIKIPEDIA COMMENT CORPUS
Here we describe our approach to generating a corpus of discus-
sion comments from English Wikipedia. Every Wikipedia page,
including articles and user pages, has an accompanying "talk page"
that can be used for communicating with other users. Discussion
pages pertaining to user pages are said to belong to the user talk
namespace, while discussions pertaining to articles belong to the
article talk namespace. Although there are 35 talk namespaces in
total, we focus on these two throughout the paper since they contain
at least an order of magnitude more discussion pages and comments
than the others.
MediaWiki, the software underlying Wikipedia, does not impose
any constraints on editing talk pages. However, an edit on a talk
page typically consists of a user adding a comment to a discussion
in accordance with a set of formatting conventions. Figure 8 gives
an example of a conventionally formatted discussion.
Figure 8: Example of a discussion thread taken from [32]. Includes
the raw MediaWiki markdown or "Wiki text" and the corresponding
rendering.
One approach to generating a corpus of comments, is to take a
current snapshot of all talk pages and parse each page into discus-
sions and comments. The downside of this approach is that com-
ments with personal attacks are usually quickly removed and that
comments on user talk pages are often removed after they have
been read to reduce clutter. As a result, no single snapshot of talk
pages will contain a representative or complete collection of com-
ments made on Wikipedia.
We pursue an alternative approach, which involves processing
the "revision history", which represents the history of edits on a
page as a sequence of files. There is a separate file, called a revi-
sion, corresponding to the state of the article after each edit. We
can compute a diff between successive revisions of a talk page to
see what text was added as a result of each edit. The benefit of this
approach is that it captures all content that has been added to a talk
page.10 The downside is that the content added during a talk page
edit is not always a full, new comment. The content added can
10Note that there is a mechanism for removing revisions from the
public record, and that personal attacks are a valid reason for doing
so [34]. Since this work is based entirely on publicly available data,
comments introduced on deleted revisions are not included in our
corpus.
also represent a modification of an existing comment. For com-
pleteness, we include the text added in these types of edits in our
corpus.
In practice, we processed the revision history from a public dump
of English Wikipedia made available on 2016-01-13. To generate
the set of diffs from the revision history, we used the existing mwd-
iffs [8] python package along with the standard longest-common-
substring diff algorithm. For the purpose of this study we define a
talk page comment as the concatenation of the MediaWiki markup
added during an edit of a talk page. We also compute a clean, plain-
text version of each comment by stripping out any html or Medi-
aWiki markup, which we use in the crowd-sourcing task described
below.
While manually inspecting the data, we found that a large por-
tion of comments left on talk pages (20%-50%, depending on the
namespace) were clearly administrative in nature and generated us-
ing a bot or template. In this study we are interested in comments
made by human users in the context of discussions. After using a
regular expression to filter out all messages from these users, we
still observed a large number of administrative comments with lit-
tle or nor modification on many user talk pages. We generated a
another set of regular expressions to remove the most commonly
occurring comments of this nature. Table 6 gives the number of
comments in the user and article talk namespaces after each filter-
ing step.
Namespace All No Bot No
Bot/Admin
User 47.3M 36.5M 24.2M
Article 47.8M 39.2M 39.2M
Totals 95.1M 75.7 63.4M
Table 6: Summary statistics of comment corpus broken down by
namespace. We first filter out all comments from bot accounts and
then filter out messages containing templates used for administra-
tive purposes.
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